

THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF ANTISEMITISM

BY A MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF THE JEWISH CHRONICLE

WITH A FOREWORD BY DR. H. L. STERN

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The Primary Cause

OF

ANTISEMITISM

*AN ANSWER TO THE
JEWISH QUESTION*

By

ABRAHAM S. SCHOMER

Author of "How We Can Help Ourselves," etc.



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Dedicated to the Cherished Memory of
MY FATHER
NAUM MEIR SHAIKEWITZ SCHOMER

PREFACE.

In the following pages an attempt is made to explain the origin and primary cause of antisemitism, thereby answering the Jewish Question, which for the past twenty centuries has been the most *vexata quaestio* of mankind.

The theory presented here is a new one. But from the positive data at our command, the author elicited the new theory which, he believes, fully explains the reason for the continuous existence of antisemitism.

The reader is requested to excuse some lengthy illustrations and repetitions of certain facts which will be met with in the course of the inquiry. The subject being a difficult one, it was necessary, in order to make it accessible to the general reading public, to present it in as popular and intelligible a manner as the subject permits.

At this stage it is also the author's wish to say a few words concerning his misgivings as to how the world may treat his theory and himself; his object being to call the reader's attention to a peculiar phenomenon and rule observed in the history of mankind, to which the author hopes to be an exception.

At no time in the history of civilization have new theories, no matter how true they were, succeeded at first in obtaining the stamp of approval of mankind. They required the aid of time to force an ingress into the minds of men and become accepted as fundamental truths.

The fates of the authors were therefore similar to those of their theories and even worse. As the theories had suffered from tyrannous criticism, ridicule and every possible biting sarcasm, so were their authors subjected to similar ordeals to which were yet added unfounded accusations and calumny. In-

stead of appreciation, the theorist received scorn and hatred, instead of encouragement and approval, reproach and misjudgment.

* * *

The application of mathematical formulas in the solution of the Jewish problem, which the author has introduced in this work, will probably strike the reader as unconventional. However, the author believes this method will present the subject in a clear way and bring it down to a definite point.

The author hereby wishes to express his gratitude—

To his sister, Miss Rose Schomer, for her careful perusal of the manuscript of this thesis and for some important criticisms which she offered on certain points therein, thereby enabling the author to correct them before it went to press;

To Mr. A. S. Freidus, of the New York Public Library, for his friendly aid in the research of bibliography on the Jewish Question;

To Mr. Sampson Lederhendler, for his kind assistance in reading the proofs of this work.

This book is submitted to the public in general and the student in particular with the hope that they will, as the author did, find the solution of the Jewish problem here presented to be a correct one.

THE AUTHOR.

New York, November, 1908.

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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

In view of the fact that after all that has been written concerning the Jewish Question, it still continues to be regarded as a riddle and mystery, it is of the utmost importance for us, before we start out on the voyage of discovery of the origin and primary cause of anti-semitism, to prepare ourselves by first considering the general nature of problems and riddles; problem solvers and their relation to mankind; the methods employed for solving problems, and the nature of cause and effect in the general sense of these terms.

OF PROBLEMS AND RIDDLES.

Every matter and every phenomenon which we do not understand we regard as a problem, and by the very nature of our being we seek to understand and explain it. As soon as we have mentally grasped the nature of the thing or

of the phenomenon, and are able to explain the effect by the cause, we announce the problem solved. Thenceforth we regard that particular thing or phenomenon as something ordinary and usual; the problem ceases to be.

It is quite otherwise when after our research we fail to find the answer, and we realize that our efforts at a solution are futile; we then no longer consider the phenomenon as merely a problem; we begin to look upon it as a mystery—a riddle. The more time passes away, and the more we have exerted ourselves without success, the more involved the riddle seems to be, till we begin to view it with superstition; not because we are of a superstitious disposition, but for the simple reason that the nature of our mind is such that it regards with awe things it cannot understand, and unconsciously, through a certain psychological process unperceived by ourselves, the mind responds to a kind of mysterious

speculation, which by its nature is superstition.

There is also another similar form of expression against things we do not understand. This form is *prejudice*.

Prejudice and superstition are very closely related and often follow each other.

Let any man look critically into the secret workings of his own mind and he will find that, notwithstanding his education and knowledge, if he be confronted for a considerable time with an unexplainable situation, he will discover within himself the germs of superstition and prejudice.

The fact that we are at times unable to solve a problem does certainly not mean that we actually deal with a mystery. It shows only that either we are not sufficiently equipped with the requisite knowledge for the task, or we are on the wrong path of our inquiry, and are looking for the solution in the wrong

direction. Not infrequently do we complicate problems and render their solution impossible simply by starting out from wrong premises, and afterward we discover that the problem which was given up as a hopeless riddle is in fact based upon some simple proposition which was either not noticed or misunderstood. Under such circumstances we strikingly resemble that mechanic to whom a box was handed with a request that he find its secret opening. He turned and examined the box on every side for hours, but without success. In despair he declared that the secret of the opening was too difficult for him. To his astonishment he was shown that the box held no secret at all, but opened in a simple manner like all ordinary boxes.

OF PROBLEM SPECIALISTS AND THEIR RELA-
TION TO MANKIND.

Non omnia possumus omnes.—It is

impossible that all men should do all things and understand all things. Mankind instinctively recognizes this fact, and is therefore satisfied when there are certain classes of men designated as specialists, who master important problems.

Mankind does not regard the most complicated thing or phenomenon as a mystery if it is aware that it is no mystery to the specialist.

To the vast majority of men, wireless telegraphy, for instance, is certainly a riddle; the same is true of the telephone, the phonograph and hundreds of other complicated inventions. Yet everybody looks at these things and their phenomena as ordinary, because every one has the consciousness that they are the product of inventors who have created them and consequently understand them.

In the same manner we behold mankind, for example, relying on the class of specialists known as physicians. While most maladies and diseases are mys-

teries and riddles to the layman, yet mankind does not fear the diseases known to be curable, but is in mortal dread of maladies known to be incurable.

This is because the medical profession admits that *it* is unable to discover the causes of those diseases.

Let us take as an illustration the disease known as cancer. Because it is the *crux medicorum* it is also the puzzle of mankind, and is feared by everybody. But no sooner will the physician announce that he has discovered the cause of cancer, and demonstrate that he cures it, then all fear will vanish and the laymen, who knew nothing about it, either before or after the discovery of its cause and cure, will say in all confidence that cancer is not a serious disease, *because it is curable*.

We are also aware that there are, for instance, certain diseases which are curable, although their causes are not known; as rheumatism, kidney diseases,

etc. In such instances we observe the difference in the physician's manner of action. For diseases of which the causes are known he prescribes or operates with positiveness and certainty; but in cases the causes of which are unknown he will be in doubt as to the cure, and should the least complication arise in the condition of the patient, the physician will be thrown into utter confusion and will no longer be certain as to the remedy.

This is true not only with the physician, but with men of every class when they are called upon to treat problems the real causes of which are unknown to them.

OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED IN SOLVING
EVERY-DAY PROBLEMS.

In considering the manner in which every-day problems are being solved, we find that there are two methods used. When such a problem is put to men we

observe that some will try to *guess* the answer, while others will endeavor to *discover* and *understand* the answer. The answers which the two will give will both be opinions. The opinion of the guesser is not based on reason and facts. It is given without sure grounds for the inference and is therefore a judgment based on "perhaps" and "maybe." In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the guesser will fail to strike upon the correct answer, but if by chance he will stumble upon the right way, we will even then have no confidence in his opinion, because there will be nothing in it on which the mind can settle in the conviction that it has attained the truth. The guesser himself will be far from certain as to the correctness of his judgment and will not trust himself for the same reason. The least forcible argument which will be presented against his opinion will swerve him from his position and make him change his mind, and this he

will do as many times as there will be arguments.

Not so with the one who discovers and understands the answer. This one will state an opinion which is supported by facts and arguments. Such an opinion is a certainty, a truth to which eventually every mind will yield.

These two classes of men are met with daily in every walk of life—socially, in business and among the professionals. Among all these there are ever present the guesser and the one who knows.

OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED IN SOLVING WORLD PROBLEMS.

In considering the manner in which world problems are solved we also find that there are two methods used. These can be designated as the *literary* method and the *scientific* method.

The difference between the literary and the scientific method is striking. The

views of the litterateur are undoubtedly highly interesting and instructive, as he always opens glimpses of truth and stimulates thought. In the literary method we frequently find that the litterateur resorts to the form of the essay, the novel, the drama, and so forth, wherein he treats on problems. But he never solves them. At best his suggestions and plans will help to slightly improve conditions for a short time.

The reason for the litterateur's failure to solve problems is that he treats on the effects and not on the causes of phenomena. As no effect ceases unless the cause is removed, the litterateur's suggested remedies are of no great importance, for the cause he never finds. His remedies, therefore, are not fundamental.

The scientific method, on the other hand, solves problems because it is directed for the discovery of the primary causes, the fundamental truths,

and aims to establish first principles upon which all effects rest.

We thus see that in undertaking to solve a problem there is but one method which may enable the solver to succeed, and that is the scientific method.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.

Science has established the rule which stands to-day as an axiom, that every effect must be preceded by an adequate cause. In other words, it is impossible that there should be any kind of phenomenon without there being, underlying it, some real cause. It is for this reason that in physical and social sciences there prevails the maxim, that the cause ceasing, the effect ceases, *ipso facto*. To attempt the extermination of effects leads to nothing, unless this is done by the annihilation of the cause which produces them.

It is most difficult to trace effects up to the primary causes. The reason for it

is clear; in a long train of events every effect in its turn becomes a cause which produces another effect, and the new effect as well becomes a cause for still another effect, and so on *ad infinitum*. In this we see the reason why an old physical or social problem is so difficult of solution. The numerous effects which confront the solver confuse his mind, and he is lost in a labyrinth of causes and effects which lead him from one thought to another in quick succession, and yet he finds himself to be no further than when he started. He tries with all might to extricate himself and the problem from the confusion of the numerous passages which lead to nothing, and only by untiring, systematic and persistent effort can he come out successfully carrying the sought-for solution of the problem with him.

The Primary Cause of Antisemitism

I.

THE JEWISH QUESTION AND FORMER ATTEMPTS AT ITS SOLUTION.

The Jewish Question ceased to be a problem long ago. It became a mystery—a riddle.

Through the many centuries of its existence it made for itself and for its people the name of the “wandering mystery,” and is as yet regarded as the *crux criticorum*. It is nearly two thousand years since this riddle of the Sphinx has been baffling the minds of men and keeping mankind guessing.

After all that has been said and written regarding this problem, and after all the attempts which have been made by Jew and Gentile at a solution, the mys-

terry continues to this very day, and the more time elapses the more complicated and involved the riddle becomes.

When one only reflects how many able men have worked on its solution without success, it seems useless even to try at making another effort in that direction.

It is different, however, when one plunges into the intricacies of this problem of problems, and begins a systematic study of the volumes which have been written concerning it. After reading the most important works on the subject, one must admit that most of the authors have very ably treated the problem as litterateurs, but not as scientists. They have given us interesting glimpses of many truths concerning the problem, they have in a masterly manner discussed the numerous effects, but none of them traced the primary cause of all, and for this reason the Jewish Question remained unsolved.

A curious feature observable in almost every book written on the Jewish Question is the vagueness and self-contradiction evinced in the treatment of the subject.

Not only is the antisemite inconsistent in his accusations of the Jew, but the friend of the Jew also displays considerable confusion and inconsistency of thought in enumerating the virtues of the Jew and the causes of antisemitism.

According to the antisemite the Jew is a pauper and a capitalist, a contemptible coward and the boldest fighter, the most ignorant man and the too-much bright student, a miser and a spendthrift, a narrow-minded reactionary and a revolutionary radical, etc., etc.

These contradictory extremes are uttered in one breath with the positive conviction that they are true.

The friend of the Jew, on the other hand, is inconsistent, as we have said, in enumerating the Jew's virtues, and

those who sought to solve the Jewish problem were peculiarly confused and inconsistent as to the causes of anti-semitism. They all give numerous causes for Judeophobia, declaring that *most* of them and *none* of them are the real causes, contradicting their own assertions and gainsaying the statements of each other, and thus complicate the question more and more.

The reason for the confusion and inconsistency of thought regarding the Jews will be explained in the course of the inquiry.

A brief review of the thoughts of several of the best men who treated the subject will first introduce the problem itself to the reader and show its most important points; secondly, it will show the manner of treatment the problem received at their hands, and lastly, it will enable the reader to judge rightly of the new theory presented in the following chapters.

We shall therefore begin with the brochure of the late Dr. Leo Pinsker, a Russian Jew, which appeared in the year 1881, under the title, "Auto-Emanicipation."

This brochure may be considered as the ablest effort at an analysis of the problem. Its strength of style, glimpses of truth and force of argument impress the mind as perhaps no other work on the same subject, and yet it cannot be regarded as a scientific work, but only as a splendid literary effort.

Among other things that brochure contains the following:

"The eternal problem presented by the Jewish Question stirs men to-day, as it did ages ago. It remains unsolved, like the squaring of the circle, unlike which, however, it is still a burning question. This is due to the fact that it is not merely a problem of theoretic interest, but one of prac-

tical, which renews its youth from day to day, as it were, and presses more and more imperiously for a solution.

" . . . After the Jewish people had given up their existence as an actual state, as a political entity, they could nevertheless not succumb to total destruction—they did not cease to exist spiritually as a nation. The world saw in this people the uncanny form of one of the dead walking among the living. This ghostly apparition of a people without unity or organization, without land or other bond of union, no longer alive, and yet moving about among the living—this strange form, hardly paralleled in history, unlike anything that preceded or followed it, could not fail to make a strange, peculiar impression upon the imagination of the peoples. And if the fear of the ghosts is something innate and has a certain justification in the psychic life of humanity,

what wonder that it asserted itself powerfully at the sight of this dead and yet living nation?

“Fear of the Jewish ghost has been handed down and strengthened for generations and centuries. It led to a prejudice which, in its connection with other circumstances (to be discussed later), opened the way of Judeophobia.

“Along with a number of other unconscious and superstitious ideas, instincts and idiosyncrasies, Judeophobia also has been fully naturalized among all peoples of the earth with whom the Jews had intercourse. Judeophobia is a form of demonopathy.

“Judeophobia is a psychic disorder. As a psychic disorder it is hereditary and as a disease transmitted for two thousand years it is incurable.

“. . . Friend and foe alike have

tried to explain or to justify this hatred of the Jews by bringing all sorts of charges against them. They are said to have crucified Jesus, to have drunk Christian blood, to have poisoned wells, to have taken usury, to have exploited the peasants, and so forth. These and a thousand other charges against an entire people were proved groundless.

" . . . The extent and the manner in which this antipathy is manifested depends, of course, upon the cultural status of each people. The antipathy as such, however, exists everywhere and at all times, no matter whether it appears in the form of deeds of violence or envious jealousy, or under the mask of tolerance and protection. To be plundered as a Jew or to be protected as a Jew is equally humiliating, equally painful to the self-respect of the Jews.

" . . . In the psychology of the

peoples then, we find the basis of the prejudice against the Jewish nation; but other factors besides, not less important, which render impossible the fusion or equalization of the Jews with the other peoples, must also be considered.

“. . . If the basis of our reasoning is sound, if the prejudice of the human race against us rests upon anthropological and social principles, innate and ineradicable, we must look no more to the slow progress of humanity, and we must learn to recognize that as long as we lack a home of our own, such as the other nations have, we must resign forever the noble hope of becoming the equals of our fellow men.”

In conclusion Dr. Pensker says:

“. . . We may sum up the contents of this pamphlet in the following sentences:

“. . . The Jews are not a living

nation; they are everywhere aliens, therefore they are despised.

“ . . . The civil and political emancipation of the Jews is not sufficient to raise them in the estimation of the peoples.

“ . . . The proper, the only remedy, would be the creation of a Jewish nationality, of a people living upon their own soil, the auto-emancipation of the Jew, their emancipation as a nation among nations by the acquisition of a home of their own.

“ . . . A way must be opened for the national regeneration of the Jews by a conference of Jewish notables.”

Pinsker's pamphlet did not fail to create a stir among thinking Jews. A conference of delegates from almost all the countries of Europe met to discuss the fundamental idea set forth by him, but failed to formulate an effective plan for the solution of the problem. The

only practical outcome was the establishment of a society for the aid of Jewish immigrants in Palestine and Syria.

Fourteen years after the publication of Pinsker's brochure, the late Dr. Theodor Herzl came forth with his famous booklet, "A Jewish State," which has since, with the untiring efforts of its lamented author, created the great party in Israel known as the Zionists.

This historical brochure presents nearly the same arguments as that of Dr. Pinsker; it pronounces the same decision that the cure for antisemitism is that the Jews should settle in a territory of their own, and it formulates the plan how this can be accomplished. Among other things it reads:

" . . . The Jewish Question still exists. It would be useless to deny it. It is a remnant of the Middle Ages, which civilized nations do not even yet seem able to shake off, try as they

will. They certainly showed a generous desire to do so when they emancipated us. The Jewish Question exists wherever Jews live in perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried by Jews in the course of their migrations. We naturally move to those places where we are not persecuted, and there our presence produces persecution. This is the case in every country, and will remain so, even in those most highly civilized, France itself being no exception—till the Jewish Question finds a solution on a political basis. The unfortunate Jews are now carrying antisemitism into England; and they have already introduced it in America.

“. . . I believe that I understand antisemitism, which is really a highly complex movement. I consider it from a Jewish standpoint, yet without fear or hatred. I believe that I can see what elements there are in it

of vulgar sport, of common trade jealousy, of inherited prejudice, of religious intolerance, and also of pretended self-defense. I think the Jewish Question is no more a social than a religious one, notwithstanding that it sometimes takes these and other forms. It is a national question, which can only be solved by making it a political world-question to be discussed and controlled by the civilized nations of the world in council.

“. . . In vain are we loyal patriots, our loyalty in some places running to extremes; in vain do we make the same sacrifices of life and property as our fellow citizens; in vain do we strive to increase the fame of our native land in science and art, or her wealth by trade and commerce. In countries where we have lived for centuries we are still cried down as strangers, and often by those whose ancestors were not yet domiciled in

the land when Jews had already made experience of suffering.

“. . . For old prejudice against us still lies deep in the hearts of the people. He who would have proofs of it need only listen to the people where they speak with frankness and simplicity; proverb and fairy tale are both antisemitic. A nation is a great child, which can certainly be educated; but its education would, even in most favorable circumstances, occupy such a vast amount of time that we could, as already mentioned, remove our own difficulties by other means long before the process was accomplished.

“. . . No one can deny the gravity of the Jews' situation. Wherever they live in perceptible numbers they are more or less persecuted. Their equality before the law, granted by statute, has become practically a dead letter.

“. . . Attacks in Parliaments,

in assemblies, in the press, in the pulpit, in the streets, on journeys, for example, their exclusion from certain hotels—even in places of recreation, become daily more numerous, the forms of persecution varying according to the countries in which they occur. In Russia, impositions are levied on Jewish villages; in Roumania, a few human beings are put to death; in Germany, they get a good beating when the occasion serves; in Austria, antisemites exercise terrorism over all public life; in Paris, they are shut out of the so-called best social circles and excluded from clubs. Shades of anti-Jewish feeling are innumerable. But this is not to be an attempt to make out a doleful category of Jewish hardships; it is futile to linger over details, however painful they may be.

“. . . Every nation in whose midst Jews live is, either covertly or openly, antisemitic.”

Dr. Herzl then discusses the previous attempts at a solution by colonization, and the diversion of poor Jews to fresh districts, and he adds:

“. . . We cannot get the better of antisemitism by any of these methods. It cannot die out so long as the causes are not removed. Are they removable?

“. . . Antisemitism increases day by day, and hour by hour, among the nations; indeed it is bound to increase, because the causes of its growth continue to exist, and cannot be removed. Its remote cause is our loss of the power of assimilation during the Middle Ages; its immediate cause is our excessive production of mediocre intellects, who cannot find an outlet downwards or upwards; that is to say, no wholesome outlet in either direction. When we sink, we become a revolutionary proletariat,

the subordinate officers of the revolutionary party; when we rise, there rises also our terrible power of the purse.”

The remedy he suggested is:

“. . . Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.”

Pinsker and Herzl had the same identical views on the subject, and we also do not fail to observe that both entertained the idea that the modern peoples' prejudice against the Jews is an inherited prejudice which originated from fear of the Jews and superstition concerning the Jews. What caused that fear and superstition and why progressive civilization has failed to cure it, they have left unanswered.

In his able treatise of "Antisemitism, Its History and Causes," Bernard Lazare, in summing up his views on the fate of antisemitism, says:

"We have seen then that the causes of antisemitism are, in their nature, ethnic, religious, political and economic. They are all causes of far-reaching importance, and they exist not because of the Jew alone, nor because of his neighbors alone, but principally because of prevailing social conditions. Ignorant of the real cause of their sentiments, those who profess antisemitism justify their opinion by accusations against the Jew which, as we have seen, do not at all agree with facts. Charges racial, charges religious, charges political and economic, none of these grievances of antisemitism are well founded. Some, like the ethnic grievances, arise from a false conception of race;

others like the religious and political charges are due to a narrow and incomplete interpretation of historical evolution; and last of all, the economic count, has its justification in the necessity of concealing the strife going on within the capitalist class. None of these accusations is justified. It is no more correct to say that the Jew is a pure Semite than it would be to say the European peoples are pure Aryans. There is, in fact, no legitimate basis for the very notion of Aryan and Semite, one superior to the other. We have seen that there is no such thing as race in the sense in which the word is generally employed; that is, to denote a human aggregate, descended from the same pair of primitive ancestors, and suffering no admixture of foreign elements throughout the entire course of its development. The belief which made purity of blood the basis of communal life,

even though it must have been justified at a time when humanity consisted of a number of minute and heterogeneous groups, was no longer tenable when these groups united to form cities. The idea, nevertheless, persisted and became an ethnological fiction, which ancient cities embellished with legends in recounting the lives of their heroic founders. The fiction changed when cities in turn began to unite, and nations arose; but it survived just the same and gave rise to the construction of interminable genealogies for the purpose of establishing a common descent for all the members of the same State.

“. . . The Jews are not in themselves the creators of present conditions, but merely by the force of inherited habits have been more able to adapt themselves to prevailing circumstances. They are not the founders of this capitalistic, financiering,

stock-jobbing, trading, manufacturing, society of ours, though they have profited by it more than any others. They enjoy at present many great advantages, not because they resort to methods of procedure which are unfair or dishonest, as their adversaries declare, but because in the course of centuries hostile legislation, religious persecutions and the political and social restrictions under which they lived have served to prepare them for the present form of society, by equipping them with superior weapons for the daily struggle of life.

“Still though the Jews are not a race, they were, until our own days, a nation. They did not fail to perpetuate their national characteristics, their religion and their theological code, which was at the same time a social code.”

Mr. Lazare then goes on discussing at length the anti-Judaism of modern times, showing it to be the product of the Jewish spirit of national exclusiveness and of a reaction on the part of the conservative spirit against the tendencies set into motion by the Revolution in economic causes, as are expressed in the struggle between the proletariat and the industrial and financial classes. He winds up thus:

“. . . This antisemitic movement, in its origin reactionary, has become transformed and is acting now for the advantage of the revolutionary cause. Antisemitism stirs up the middle class, the small tradesman, and sometimes the peasant, against the Jewish capitalist, but in doing so it gently leads them toward socialism, prepares them for anarchy, infuses in them a hatred for all capitalists, and,

more than that, for capital in the abstract.

“And thus, unconsciously, antisemitism is working its own ruin, for it carries in itself the germ of destruction. Nor can it escape its fate. In preparing the way for Socialism and Communism, it is laboring at the elimination not only of the economic cause, but also of the religious and ethnic causes which have engendered it, and which will disappear with this society of ours, of which they are the products.

“Such, then, is the probable fate of modern antisemitism. I have tried to show how it may be traced back to the ancient hatred against the Jews: how it persisted after the emancipation of the Jews, how it has grown and what are its manifestations. I have attempted to discover the reasons for this existence, and having determined those, have ventured to predict its fu-

ture on the basis of them. In every way I am led to believe that it must ultimately perish, and that it will perish for the various reasons which I have indicated, because the Jew is undergoing a process of change; because religious, political, social and economic conditions are likewise changing; but above all, because antisemitism is one of the last, though most long lived, manifestations of that old spirit of reaction and narrow conservatism, which is vainly attempting to arrest the onward movement of the Revolution."

According to Mr. Lazare, then, antisemitism is the effect of four distinct causes—ethnic, religious, political and economic, and these are caused *not* by the Jews, but by prevailing *social conditions*. The antisemites are ignorant of the real cause of their sentiments and therefore justify them by accusations

against the Jews who, in the course of centuries of hostile legislation, religious persecution and political and social restrictions under which they lived, were prepared for the present form of society, and are equipped with superior weapons for the daily struggle of life. Finally, antisemitism is the product of the Jewish national exclusiveness.

The real cause for antisemitism then, according to Lazare, is Jewish national exclusiveness, of which fact the antisemites are ignorant.

Why those who profess antisemitism should be ignorant of this real cause of their antagonistic sentiments to the Jews, and why there should therefore be four other causes for antisemitism, Mr. Lazare fails to explain, and the Jewish Question only appears to be still more involved and remains unanswered.

No less interesting are the views of the noted French author, Anatole Leroy-

Beaulieu, who in his work, "Israel Among the Nations," expresses views most of which are similar to those of Mr. Lazare. In his introductory remarks Mr. Beaulieu says:

" . . . Antisemitism is consistent with neither the principles nor the genius of our nation (France). It came to us from the outside, from countries which have neither our spirit nor our traditions. It came to us from across the Rhine, from old Germany, always ready for religious quarrels, and always imbued with the spirit of caste; from new Germany, all inflated with race pride and scornful of whatever is not Teutonic.

"Antisemitism may be traced also to Russia, to that huge and shapeless Russia, which, with its steppes and forests, has remained isolated from the great currents of modern life; to holy, Orthodox Russia, half Oriental,

half Asiatic, which endeavors to find its national unity in its religious unity, and which regards the Catholic and Lutheran with little more favor than the Israelite; to that autocratic Russia, which differs from us in all its institutions, as well as in all its conditions, be they economic, political, religious or social. Whatever sympathy we may feel with the Slavonic mind or the Russian spirit the Russians, who have so often emulated us, would be greatly astonished to see us copying them; as well might one propose to the Czar to model the government of his moujiks and cossacks on that of the French Republic.

“. . . It must not be inferred from what has been said that the complaints of the antisemites are wholly imaginary. By no means. Whether they attack our private or our public morals and customs, many of their complaints are but too well founded.

Abroad, as well as at home, and most especially, perhaps, in our republican France, they are right, these noisy antisemites, in loudly denouncing certain governmental methods, certain practices which seem about to take root in the life of modern nations. Antisemitism may have been, in its time, a protest on the part of the public conscience against culpable concessions of men in office, against the venality of politicians and the domination, at once mysterious and contemptuous, of stock-jobbing interlopers. Despite its excesses and outrages, antisemitism is within its rightful province when it assails the worship of money, the scandalous barter of political influences, and the shameless exploitation of the people by the men whom they have elected; or, again, when it unmasks the hypocritical intolerance of inconsistent free-thinkers, who

have erected irreligion and corruption into a method of government.

“. . . Modern society is ailing indeed, more ailing than the most honest antisemite imagines. The error of antisemitism lies in its misapprehension of the origin and seat of the evil. It sees, or is willing to see, but one of the symptoms, and it calls this symptom the cause of the disease. Antisemitism is essentially ‘simple-minded’ in the literal sense of the word. It fails to grasp the complexity of social phenomena. But this failure which should prove its ruin is largely the cause of its success with the masses, who in their simplicity are always carried away by that which they deem simple.

“Even if the Jews had all the vices and all the power which the hatred of their enemies sees fit to ascribe to them, it were none the less childish to discover in a handful of Semites the

source of the evils that afflict modern society.

"It is not true that in order to restore it to health we need but to eliminate the Semite, as the surgeon's knife eradicates a cyst or a malignant excrescence. The extent and gravity of the evil are of a different nature. The evil is in ourselves, in our blood, in the very marrow of our bones. To cure us it will not be enough to remove a foreign body from our flesh. Though every Jew be banished from French soil, though Israel be swept from the face of Europe, France would not be one whit more healthy, nor Europe in any better state. The first condition of a cure is a knowledge of the nature of one's malady. Now, antisemitism deceives us; it blinds us to our condition by trying to make us believe that the cause of the

evil is external instead of internal. There is no more dangerous error. We are afflicted with an internal trouble, due to our constitution and our entire mode of living; and the anti-semites insist upon telling us over and over again that it is but a superficial ailment, brought on by chance, and foreign to our race and our blood. Even when they boast of exposing our secret wounds, they misconstrue their nature; consequently, instead of furnishing a cure for them, they are in great danger of inflaming them still more.

“Such will be, I doubt not, the feeling of every reader who is sufficiently thoughtful and independent to base his opinions upon reflections, and not upon the antipathies of the mob. Antisemitism, even when most justified in its complaints, is mistaken as to the source of our evils.”

In another part of the work, Mr. Beaulieu asks:

“. . . Whence comes this steady and involuntary antipathy? Has it no other cause than the instinctive survival of the prejudices of our fore-fathers? Honestly speaking, I would not dare to assert this. In order to account for it we must look more closely at the Jewish race, whose contact is still distasteful to so many men of less noble blood; especially as, in order to understand the race well, it is not enough that we should know of what ethnic or religious elements it is composed. Before deciding what place the modern nations should assign to the Jews, it will be well to study the essential traits of the Jewish mind and character. The investigation will, I think, bring out some interesting problems in psychology.”

Mr. Beaulieu then goes on with an in-

quiry into the physiology, psychology, genius, spirit and particularism of the Jew. He finds the Jewish characteristics favorable to Israel, and speculates on the cause of antisemitism which he cannot discover, although he gives many possible causes. After a diligent search under the literary method, he fails to solve the problem.

We could thus give the views of many other noted authors on the Jewish Question, but as we said before, while they all display brilliancy of style and thought and give us bright glimpses of truth, the truth itself is not discovered. On none of their theories can the mind settle in the conviction that it has traced the real primary cause of antisemitism.

II.

OF THE PREJUDICE AGAINST THE JEW.

From the foregoing the reader undoubtedly observed that every phase of antisemitism, no matter in what place and with which class of people it is found, always circles around one point, namely, *prejudice*.

We must therefore bear in mind that at the bottom of Judeophobia there is always that prejudice which must be the real cause of all accusations against the Jews.

The term “Antisemitism,” as we have seen, and according to the Jewish Encyclopedia, has its origin in the ethnological theory that the Jews, as Semites, are entirely different from the Aryan or Indo-European populations, and can never be amalgamated with them. The word implies that the Jews are not ob-

jected to on account of their religion, but on account of their racial characteristics. As such are mentioned: greed, a special aptitude for money-making, aversion to hard work, clannishness and obtrusiveness, lack of social tact, and especially of patriotism. Finally the term is used to justify resentment for every crime or objectionable act committed by an individual Jew.

From what we have already learned we know that the foregoing suppositions regarding the Jews are groundless, that the prejudice against the Jews is *not* the effect of any or all of the said accusations brought against them, but that the accusations are made *because* of the prejudice.

We now begin to realize wherein the difficulty of the Jewish Question lies. If instead of that *prejudice* there were some *definite idea*, if the Gentile could actually point to a definite reason for his dislike of the Jew, there would be no

riddle at all, since the cause of the dislike would be clear. But because what we have before us is *prejudice*, which does not explain the *real cause* for that sentiment, it makes of the Jewish Question a riddle. In that also we find the reason why so many able authors could not arrive at any definite conclusion on this problem.

Mr. Charles Waldstein, in his work, "The Jewish Question and the Mission of the Jews," after considering the numerous antisemitic outbreaks in various countries, could after all not find some definite point on which he could settle as the cause of the violent Judeophobia; and he asks:

"Is there a Jewish Question at all?" He then continues: "I maintain that there is not, in the sense in which we speak of a Labor Question, or the Eastern Question, or the Home Rule Question. For the element of

unity is hiding the subject upon which it is proposed to establish a question; and the attributes which it represents are different from, nay, opposed to, one another according to the circumstances in which it has been placed."

In concluding his preface, the same author says:

"But at the end I ask myself: whether all I have written in this book will be of any avail to dispel the prejudice among enemies of the Jews?"

In the same doubtful tone Mr. G. F. Abbott in his book, "Israel in Europe," says:

"The Jewish Question—a question than which none possess a deeper interest for the student of the past, or a stronger fascination for the speculator of the future; a question compared with which the Eastern, the Irish, and all other vexed questions

are but things of yesterday; a question which has taxed the ingenuity of European statesmen ever since the dispersion of this Eastern people over the lands of the West."

Now, why are all these thinkers so perplexed when confronted with the Jewish Question? Why have other vexed questions, for instance, the Labor, Irish and Eastern questions, never been regarded with such amazement and bewilderment as this one? Why has no other question called forth fear and superstition as the Jewish Question does? Why is there an answer to every other question, and not to this one?

Because in all other vexed questions there is, after all, a clear issue, something definite on which the mind can settle and consider, while in the Jewish Question there is no clear issue, nothing definite before the mind. All that the mind can perceive is a *prejudice* against

a people, the reason for which is not known and cannot be discovered.

The prejudice against the Jew—if the many able authors who have investigated, searched and have written on the subject, had stopped at this point only and endeavored to look for the mysterious cause of the prejudice instead of wandering away in other directions in search for answers to other questions, the problem would have been solved long ago.

What is needed to solve this puzzle is the *cause* of the *effect*, which is designated by the word *prejudice*, and which causes other effects most terrible to the Jewish people and most degrading to civilization. That cause we will go in search of in the following pages.

III.

BEGINNINGS OF JUDEOPHOBIA.

After a careful perusal of the history of the Jews, we find Judeophobia in evidence at two distinct periods far from each other. These are, when the Israelites sojourned with the Egyptians, and when, after being a full-fledged nation for nearly a thousand years, they were dispersed among the peoples of the world.

During the period of the Jewish existence as a nation, there is no evidence of that *repugnance* and prejudice which we find in the time of Israel's Goluth in Egypt and his Goluth among the nations after losing Palestine.

What is remarkable is that we discover, as we shall presently demonstrate, in the dislike of the Israelite by the Egyptian, and the dislike of the Jew

by the modern Gentile, the *same* prejudice as their cause and the *same* cause for the prejudice.

Mr. Bernard Lazare in Chapter II. of his already mentioned treatise, "Antisemitism, Its History and Causes," very ably sums up the antagonism against Israel at the two different periods, and although we do not agree with his conclusion as to the relation between the Egyptians and the Israelites, we shall nevertheless quote him and then discuss the proposition, which is of great importance in our inquiry.

Mr. Lazare says:

"Modern antisemites who are in quest of sires for themselves, unhesitatingly trace the first demonstrations against the Jews back to the day of ancient Egypt. For that purpose they are particularly pleased to refer to Genesis xlivi, 32, where it is said: 'The Egyptians might not eat bread

with the Hebrews; for that it is an abomination unto the Egyptians.' They also rely upon a few verses of Exodus, among them the following: 'Behold, the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we; come on, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply.' (Exodus i, 9, 10.)

"It is certain that the sons of Jacob who came to the land of Goshen under the Shepherd Pharaoh Aphobis were treated by the Egyptians with the same contempt as their brothers, the Hyksos, referred to in hieroglyphic texts as lepers, called also 'plague' and 'pest' in some inscriptions. They arrived at that very epoch when a very strong national sentiment manifested itself against the Asiatic invaders, hated for their cruelty; this sentiment soon led to the war of independence, which resulted in the final victory of Ahmos I., and the enslavement of the Hebrews. How-

ever, unless one is a violent anti-Jew, it is impossible to perceive in those remote disturbances anything beyond a mere incident in a struggle between conquerors and conquered.

“There is no antisemitism until the Jews, having abandoned their native land, settle as immigrants in foreign countries and come into contact with natives or older settlers, whose customs, race and religion are different from those of the Hebrews.

“Accordingly the history of Haman and Mordecai may be taken as the beginning of antisemitism, and the antisemites have not failed so to do. This view is, perhaps, more correct. Though the historical reality of the book of Esther can scarcely be relied upon, still it is worthy of note that its author puts into the mouth of Haman some of the complaints, which, at a later period, are uttered by Tacitus and other Latin writers. ‘And Haman

said unto the king, Ahasuerus: there is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the peoples in all the provinces of thy kingdom; and their laws are diverse from all people; neither keep they the king's laws.' " (Esther iii, 8.)

That the cause of the prejudice on the part of the Egyptians against the Israelites was the same as that existing since the time of Haman, we will demonstrate in the course of this work. Let us first consider Haman's hatred of the Jews in the kingdom of Ahasuerus.

Haman's complaint to the king was against all the Jews, but his wrath was kindled by one Jew—Mordecai.

In the words of the book Esther:

"And all the king's servants that were in the king's gate, bent the knee and prostrated themselves to Haman;

for so had the king commanded concerning him; but Mordecai bent not the knee nor prostrated himself.

“Then said the king’s servants, who were in the king’s gate, unto Mordecai, ‘Why transgressest thou the king’s command?’

“Now it came to pass when they spoke unto him day by day, and he hearkened not unto them, that they told it to Haman, to see whether the words of Mordecai would be able to stand; for he had told them that he was a Jew. (Note this last sentence.)

“And when Haman saw that Mordecai bent not the knee, nor prostrated himself for him, Haman became full of fury.

“But it appeared too contemptible in his eyes to lay his hand on Mordecai alone; for they had told him of the people of Mordecai; therefore Haman sought to destroy all the Jews that were throughout all the kingdom of

Ahashverosh, the people of Mordecai." (Esther iii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.)

Here is a clear case of prejudice against the *whole* Jewish people. Because Mordecai offended him, Haman at once charged all the Jews of the kingdom with insubordination and asked the king to destroy them all.

From the narrative it is evident that Haman was prejudiced against the Jews before the affair with Mordecai. The latter's refusal to bend his knee was only the spur to turn the prejudice into a furious hatred which only the blood of all the Jews could satisfy. If there had been no prejudice against the whole Jewish people, it would have been impossible for Haman to think of destroying all Jews because one transgressed against him.

From the foregoing observations we always arrive at one and the same conclusion, that *prejudice* is at the bottom

of all accusations against the Jews; hence, prejudice is the cause of antisemitism.

Causa latet, vis est notissima. What is the cause of the prejudice?

IV.

OF THE FACTORS IN THE PROBLEM.

We will now approach the old Jewish Question with a view of finding its solution.

Our first step is to ascertain what factors of a positive nature we are given in this problem.

We perceive that there are two certain factors—*Gentile* and *Jew*. There are no other factors and our attention must be directed toward these two only without trying to create others.

There is a certain phenomenon always in evidence in the relations between the two. This phenomenon is a *prejudice* manifested by the Gentile against the Jew. The relation in that respect between the two is ably and briefly summed up in the article, “The Public Estimate of the Jew,” which appeared in the New York *Independent*, November 8, 1906; among other things it read:

“. . . Whether it is socially, whether as a citizen in many lands, in many forms somewhere, in some form everywhere, there is still a ban, a prejudice, at least an exclamation or an interrogation point. Theoretical expression on paper and practical working of affairs are, as to him (the Jew), at variance.”

We thus have two certain factors and one uncertain one:

(1) Gentile, (2) Jew, (3) Prejudice (manifested by the first against the second).

The question which arises here is *why* that prejudice against the Jew?

That *why* is the indefinite something, the X, the unknown quantity of our problem.

If we succeed in discovering the *cause* for the *prejudice*, our task will be completed—the Jewish Question solved.

V.

OF THE RELATION AND NATURE OF THE FACTORS.

In our problem, we have seen, there are three factors, two certain and one uncertain: Gentile, Jew and Prejudice.

We know that it is the Gentile who entertains the prejudice. We also know that the Prejudice is directed against the Jew. We consequently understand the relation of the Gentile and Jew, but we do not know to what *prejudice* is related; in other words, what is the cause of the prejudice. It is clear, however, that the relation of the prejudice to that indefinite something, to the X of our problem, must necessarily be equal to the Prejudice of the Gentile against the Jew, since it is the same Prejudice which is observed as the relation of the two positive factors in the problem.

We shall therefore (although it will appear unconventional) formulate our problem in the form of a formula as follows:

The relation between the Prejudice of the Gentile and the Jew is equal to the relation of the Prejudice to X or,

Prejudice of Gentile: Jew :: Prejudice: X.

This means that the prejudice of the Gentile against the Jew is equal to and really consists in his prejudice against some cause, X.

We have learned that the prejudice against the Jew is *hic et ubique*. Its manifestations depend upon the cultural status of the people which entertains it, but it has been in existence ever since the Jewish dispersion. The prejudice then against the Jew is universal; hence, the Jewish Question is a universal one.

Having before us three factors, it is

now necessary to define and understand them.

Gentile and Jew, what are they?

First of all, we find that they are both members of the white division of the human species; that they belong to the Caucasian group. We then discover that neither of them is purely Aryan or Semitic, but both are modern men, and that the Jew as a man is not inferior to the Gentile.

Even Ernest Renan, who claims to have been the first to recognize the inferiority of the Semite to the Aryan, in his “*Le Judaïsme comme Race et comme Religion*” (assuming for argument’s sake that his theory is correct), makes the positive assertion that the Jews are not a Semitic race, and are in every respect as good modern men as the other Aryan peoples. The same view is held by many scholars already mentioned and quoted and others.

Having thus ascertained the nature of the positive factors, we shall proceed to inquire into the nature of the phenomenon—Prejudice.

Prejudice is defined as a judgment or opinion formed without due examination of the facts or reasons that are essential to a just and impartial determination; a mental decision based on other grounds than reason or justice. In other words, Prejudice is some kind of a feeling more than anything else.

Professor Joseph Baldwin, in his book, "Psychology Applied to the Art of Teaching," very simply sets forth and defines the different kinds of feeling. He says:

"Feeling.—I enjoy and suffer. I experience various feelings differing in kind. Some feelings are occasioned by sensor-excitations caused by organic stimuli; these feelings are *organic sensations*. Some feelings

are occasioned by sensor-excitations caused by external stimuli acting through the special senses; these feelings are *special sensations*. Other feelings are occasioned by ideas; these feelings are *emotions*. Feeling includes organic sensations, special sensations and emotions."

In another part of the same work Mr. Baldwin says:

"Law reigns in the Self-World.— Deeper insight satisfies me that self acts spontaneously, but acts in *uniform ways*. I find that the uniform ways in which self acts are the laws of the mental economy. Self is subject to mental laws of the mental economy. Self is subject to mental laws just as matter is subject to physical laws. Self *must* attend, in order to know. Self *must* ascend through particulars to generals. Self *must* re-

call the past through the present. Self *must* make effort, in order to growth. Law reigns in the mind-world."

Prejudice, consequently, is an emotion. It is created under some certain mental law.

The phenomena of feeling and thought and the laws of the mind are treated and explained by Psychology.

Prejudice is ever followed by the feelings of dislike and hatred; the latter feelings are followed by action, which may be of different forms, depending upon the cultural status of the man. We thus realize why the forms of antisemitism are different among the peoples where Jews are settled.

As we have seen in the foregoing pages, the late Dr. Pinsker has said that in the psychology of the peoples the basis of the prejudice against the Jewish nation is to be found, and that other factors besides not less important,

which render impossible the fusion or equalization of the Jews with the other peoples, must also be considered. Judeophobia, he said, is a psychic disorder. As a psychic disorder it is hereditary and as a disease transmitted for two thousand years it is incurable. His conclusion was, that "the Jews are not a living nation; they are everywhere aliens, therefore they are despised."

Here we discover the error of that able scholar. He labored under the mistaken impression that the prejudice against the Jew lies in the psychology of the peoples, which at best is an indefinite statement, whereas it cannot lie elsewhere but in the psychology of the individual. Here is also his error in mistaking prejudice for a psychic disease which is hereditary.

Prejudice is no more than a mental emotion caused by a phenomenon which the mind cannot understand and of which it can form no definite idea. As

soon as the mind forms a definite idea and understands the phenomenon, prejudice ceases of itself, that emotion is gone. It is consequently no disease, but the ignorant state of the mind. Ignorance is certainly not hereditary.

The same error of Dr. Pinsker was entertained by many other writers on the Jewish Question, among them also Dr. Herzl. Dr. Pinsker's conclusion that the fact of the Jew being an alien causes that prejudice, was also erroneous, as we will further demonstrate.

In a similar manner we see the other learned authors deviating from the straight road which the problem presents, thus failing to reach a definite point on the question.

To proceed now with our inquiry; we are aware that as far as the Gentile is concerned the cause for the prejudice with him is a psychologic one. We have thus ascertained what road we have to take in our inquiry with the Gentile.

Knowing that it is within his psychology we cannot make the blunder of looking for it somewhere else.

We will accordingly amend our formula thus:

The relation of the Mental attitude of Gentile to the Jew is equal to the relation of Prejudice to cause, X: or,

Mental attitude of Gentile: Jew:: Prejudice: X.

We have to discover what occurs in the mind of the Gentile when he comes in contact with a Jew, in order to get a clear idea of his emotion of prejudice. We shall therefore have to use with him introspection.

At this stage we have to consider another phase of the problem.

Emotions are by themselves effects which must necessarily be caused by some things. Without anything to cause them there cannot be any emotions.

In our problem we see that there is

the emotion of prejudice within the Gentile against the Jew, and the question, therefore, is what causes that emotion.

Since we have no other factors but Gentile and Jew and prejudice, and since the prejudice is manifested by the first against the second, it is obvious that it must be the latter who causes that emotion within the psychology of the former; hence our answer obtained is that the Jew calls forth the emotion of prejudice within the Gentile.

This answer shows us what other road we must take in order to arrive at a solution of our problem. Since it is the Jew who causes the emotion of prejudice within the mind of the Gentile, we have also to observe the Jew. With him we must use our sense-perception.

As sense-perception is an easier procedure than introspection, our next step will then be to observe the Jew and endeavor to find what there is about him

which causes that prejudice against him. Is it his appearance, his actions, or some other trait in his person?

We accordingly continue our inquiry and discover a most remarkable fact.

VI.

MAN AND JEW.

There are two kinds of Jews. Some Jews are recognized as Jews by reason of their physiognomy, manner of dress, or speech; other Jews cannot so be recognized. In neither of these classes do we find anything particularly objectionable or something which should call forth prejudice. They are not worse than, and are as good as, Gentiles.

Failing to discover anything which should justify the prejudice, we resort to some experiment. We introduce a Jew of each class to a Gentile. The one who cannot be recognized as a Jew we permit to go unrecognized as such. We then discover that the Gentile has a prejudice against the man in whom he recognized the Jew, against the other he entertains no such emotion. On the

contrary, he enjoys the other's company and sometimes even prefers him to others.

After the lapse of some time we disclose to the Gentile the identity of his friend—the Jew. We observe a change coming over the Gentile. Unperceived by himself the prejudice appears within him. As time goes on that emotion begins to do its work, he feels already a dislike against the recognized Jew, and the least dispute which may happen to arise between the two will lead to a strong dislike or hatred on the part of the Gentile. At any rate, there will ever be that “exclamation or interrogation point” deep within the mind of the Gentile. There already is a something which mars the friendship between the two, and the Jew who was much esteemed and even loved before becomes suddenly or gradually an object of fear, disrespect and even hate.

This wonderful phenomenon is cer-

tainly very puzzling and we try another experiment.

A Gentile who by his looks resembles a Jew is introduced to a Gentile, the latter mistaking him for a Jew. The result is that from the very first minute the prejudice is there. When the Gentile is informed that the person is not a Jew, the prejudice vanishes as if by magic.

Much perplexed by these experiments, we ask the Gentile for a reason, but he is unable to explain those phenomena. No matter whether the Gentile is a conservative or a radical, ignorant or highly educated, an orthodox or an atheist, the result is always the same. Even if the Gentile tries to convince himself that there is nothing the matter with him as to his feelings for the Jew, he is mistaken. Deep within him there is the emotion of prejudice smouldering and needs only the slightest provocation to be turned into a flame of hatred.

At first this phenomenon seems very

perplexing and baffling to the mind, but upon a second consideration it appears simple of explanation.

We have observed that the emotion of prejudice against a man arises within the Gentile the moment the latter gets the consciousness that the former is a Jew, otherwise that emotion is absent. It is evident, then, that it is the name Jew which causes that emotion.

This discovery is of great moment in our inquiry, for it expressly establishes the fact that while there is nothing wrong about the *man—Jew*, there is something amiss with the *name—Jew*. We cannot fail to realize the importance of this distinction, for it gives us the key to the riddle.

We thus find that the relation of the mental attitude of Gentile to the Jew is equal to the relation of prejudice to the name—Jew, or,

Mental attitude of Gentile: Jew::
Prejudice: Name—Jew.

Here it is necessary to pause and reflect. We have reached a spot with many roads leading in different directions; it is necessary therefore to guard against taking the wrong path. Let us critically consider the situation.

We have discovered that it is the name Jew which is that cause of the prejudice. Our next step should then be to consider what there may be in that name Jew which produces that emotion.

VII.

THE NAME JEW.

The name Jew is not the name of an individual, but of a certain class of men. The class of men going by that name number in the millions and have a national record. It is consequently the name of a distinct people.

Since it has been established that it is not the individual Jew who causes that prejudice, but it is the name Jew, and since that name implies the whole Jewish people, reason points to the whole Jewish people as the *cause* of that emotion of prejudice.

From what we have learned before there is nothing in that class of men, the Jewish people, which should differentiate them, as men, from the Aryan. It was also established beyond any doubt that the Jews, as well as any other of

the civilized peoples, are modern men. We have also by personal experience seen that there is nothing in the individual Jew which could cause that emotion of prejudice. Hence the individual Jew is as good a man as any other, and since there is nothing wrong about the individual Jew there can be nothing wrong about the Jewish people which is composed of individual Jews. But we have it that it is the name of the whole Jewish people which produces the prejudice not only within the psychology of one class of men, but of all classes; we therefore again reach the conclusion that there must be something the matter with the whole people after all, and we must endeavor to discover what it is.

VIII.

JEWS, JUDAISM, JEWISH RELIGION AND WHY THEY SURVIVED.

We see before us twelve million human beings identified as Jews. As we have observed, they have an historical record of a distinct people. The fact is that they regard themselves as such and are regarded in that light by the nations of the world.

As the Jews have no country of their own and are dispersed among the nations without losing their identity, they are therefore a distinct international society.

From their history we learn that about four thousand years ago their ancestors sojourned with the Egyptians and were held there in the house of bondage. They were eventually freed by Moses, an Israelite who was brought up in the

court of Pharaoh as a prince. Moses led the Israelites from Egypt and organized them at Mount Sinai as a *distinct* society, a people, for the sole purpose that they should keep holy and observe certain fundamental ethical laws as expressed in the Ten Commandments, which he engraved on stone as a lasting record. Moses also had given the Israelites by-laws which tended to keep them together as a people and particularly to enforce the observance of the said fundamental ethical principles engraved on stone—the Ten Commandments.

After Moses, at various epochs of the Jewish existence as a people, the by-laws were amended and modified to suit the times, but they always served as a school of discipline that Israel should remember and keep holy the fundamental law which ever remained unchanged and assumed greater significance and truth as time passed on.

These by-laws were in their character religious. They were enforced by the elders of the people and in the course of time assumed the form of a permanent religious institution, always with the end in view to discipline the children of Israel in morality according to the fundamental principles of the Ten Commandments, and also to prevent the fusion of the Jews with the other peoples who, at that time, were far from perceiving the truths of Judaism.

Organized as a people whose life was a definite law of highest ethical import, and surrounded by the various rules of discipline, the Jews, notwithstanding the environment of those days, continued their corporate existence separate and apart from the other peoples and upheld the spirit of the highest law, which eventually became the conception of every civilized people.

When the Jews were dispersed among the peoples of the earth, a particularly

strict religious discipline was introduced by the doctors of the Talmud. These learned men in the law of Judaism, realizing that the Jews were not on their own soil and came in close contact with the other peoples who were far from the doctrines of Judaism, and dreading the influence of the new environment, enacted numerous technical religious by-laws which were to be observed by every Jewish man, woman and child, under the penalty of disgrace of the violator.

The rabbis who thus strengthened Judaism by the Jewish religion followed the Hebrew maxim: "Train up a child in the way he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it." (Prov. xxii. 6.) This rule holds good with a people as with an individual.

The discipline of the Talmudists exercises its influence to this day not only on the orthodox Jew, but on the reformed Jews and the Jew-assimilators as well. Among the Jews are found

most radical men who are far from religion, yet they remain loyal Jews not only because of the ethical principles of Judaism, but also because they were trained to adhere to their people from which they cannot separate themselves even if they believe that they can. However, the training itself without the fundamental principles of Judaism would not be able to exert such a lasting influence.

Judaism and the Jewish religion were always so confounded as one thing that their distinction was never made clear. But it is evident that Judaism is one thing and the Jewish religion is another thing.

Judaism in itself is no more than a system of moral laws and doctrines as chiefly represented in the Scriptures, the fundamental laws of which are the Ten Commandments.

The Jewish religion, on the other hand, is an institution which consists of

a system of rites and ceremonies to be practiced as an aid to remembering and observing the fundamental principles of Judaism.

The fundamental principles of Judaism have gradually made their way among the peoples and have become the accepted truths of universal morality. The principles of Judaism are regarded as being eternal.

Now it is clear why Judaism, the Jewish religion and the Jews survived. As long as the principles of a society have life in them and are in themselves a living institution, the society itself cannot die. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the membership of the society will be kept alive by the principles for which it was organized as long as the principles themselves have not lost their vitality.

It is also clear, therefore, that the Jewish people has no other but an ethical and spiritual purpose for its exist-

ence; it is consequently an International Ethical and Spiritual People, and not an *imperium in imperio*.

The Jews can call the attention of mankind to this fact and referring to their history and life as a people, say: We are an ethical and spiritual people, international in character for the past two thousand years. We are not and never will be an *imperium in imperio* as long as we are among the nations. For proof of that consider us as we are. *Spectemur agendo*, and judge us by our martyrdom as the Jewish nation, peculiar only in that we have organized as a people for the purpose of promoting the principles of the highest ethics and exist as *people* with no other aims.

IX.

SOME OF THE SUPPOSED CAUSES.

Although we have shown in the preceding chapters that neither Judaism nor the Jewish religion is the cause of the prejudice against the Jews, we will nevertheless add a few remarks on this theme.

We find that the fundamental ethical and religious principles of the Jews do not clash with the laws of any civilized country; on the contrary, they are in full harmony with the fundamental laws of morality and conduct of every civilized people. The Ten Commandments, the fundamental laws of Judaism, are accepted by every civilization as the basis of all morality, and are in various forms introduced by legislators in every code.

The Bible, which narrates the history of the origin of the Jewish people and

in which the fundamental laws of morality appear, is held sacred by all, and with every enlightened nation it is even accepted as the sanctity on which an oath is administered.

We thus see that neither Judaism nor the Jewish religion is the cause of the emotion of prejudice against the Jews. If there is anything which does the Jews honor, it is certainly their moral and ethical code, which is held in reverence by all the world.

The supposition then, by some, that it may be the *Kulturkampf*—Judaism or the Jewish religion which causes the prejudice—must be eliminated.

Is that prejudice caused by the exclusiveness or appearance of the Jews? (According to Bernard Lazare.)

This supposition will have to be abandoned as well, when we consider that the prejudice is equally strong against the Jew assimilator, who is like the Gentile in every respect, except in name.

Is that prejudice caused by the historical fiction that the Jews have crucified Jesus?

This perhaps may be the case with some ignorant folks who know nothing of mankind and its history. Even with such it is only a secondary cause, the prejudice being there before this fiction reaches their ears. But how about the Gentiles who are familiar with the facts of history; who possess education, and are not superstitious? How about such men who know that it was the Romans who crucified Jesus, and that Jesus and the Apostles were Jews themselves? Why are they prejudiced against the Jews?

According to Pinsker and Herzl, the cause of the prejudice against the Jews lies in the supposition that they are aliens and have no country of their own.

Is this really the cause? Is it in this that we find the cause for the old *odium in longum jacens* against the Jews?

An inquiry in that direction reveals the fact that it is not so.

Beginning with an individual, we find that because one has no realty of his own and does not live in his own house, there is no prejudice against him. Going over to the consideration of corporations, we find the same conditions. No one is prejudiced against any corporation, whether it be a congregation or some other institution, because it may own no real estate, or not have its own buildings. Passing to international societies, we again fail to discover that the lack of a territory should be a cause for the emotion of prejudice. Is there any prejudice against the international brotherhood of the Freemasons, even though it is a secret society? It is known that Freemasonry is an ethical institution, numbering thousands of members, and that it has no territory of its own, yet there is no prejudice either against the society itself or against any of its mem-

bers. On the contrary, because it is an ethical and spiritual institution, it is considered an honor to be a member thereof.

At this stage we may also mention the Zionists, who form a distinct international Jewish party. While we find prejudice against the Jews at large, there is no prejudice against the Zionist party, which desires the establishment of a territorial state for the Jews, but has no territory of its own.

As regards nations with territories we find that with them the possession of territory sometimes causes jealousy of one nation toward another, which leads to enmity and war.

The Jews being the only people which was able to survive as a people though it lost its territory, established a precedent that a nation, or association of men with an ethical and spiritual purpose for its existence, can live without a territory. Hence, a territory is not the

sine qua non for the existence of an ethical people.

When a Gentile says to the Jew, "You are a stranger here," it is because of his prejudice against him, and not because the latter lacks a territory as a member of the Jewish people.

Jews think of a territory because they suffer from the prejudice against them. Otherwise they do not feel the need of a territory for the purposes of Judaism.

We cannot discover, try as we may, anything which should convince the mind that lack of a territory is the cause of the prejudice against the Jew.

As to economic conditions being the primary cause for the prejudice against the Jews (according to Lazare and Beaulieu), we also fail to find it to be the real cause, in view of the fact that the Jews, as a whole, suffer from economic conditions as much as, and even more than, the Gentiles. They suffer more because not only do they suffer from

economic conditions, but because they are also accused of being the cause of the conditions.

Other reasons which were given as possible causes for antisemitism have been proven groundless, and there is nothing in them of importance which should call for a special analysis.

We shall therefore proceed with our search for the real cause.

X.

OF SOCIETIES AND MULTITUDES.

We shall once more use our sense-perception and observe the Jewish people as a whole.

There are before us about twelve million human beings going by the name of Jews. We have learned of their origin and their aims as a people. We know that for the past twenty centuries, since they lost their own territory, they represent an International Ethical and Spiritual Society.

We are also aware of the fact that no matter whether we speak of the biggest nation, the smallest people or any association of men for some definite purpose, each of these represents a distinct society or association.

Since we speak of the twelve million Jews as a distinct society and as a defi-

nite association, let us look at it and see it.

Our sense-perception tells us that we do not see a Jewish society or a Jewish association, but what we do see is a *multitude of Jews*.

We look again and try to make sure of what we see; the picture is the same no matter how we try to observe it; before us is not a definite society of Jews, we see a big multitude of Jews.

Now, there is a great difference between a society, an association, or a people, or whatever it may be called, and a multitude, even if the multitude goes by one certain name. A multitude is not a society.

A distinct society or association has been defined as a body of persons associated for a common object. It is a definite body and is distinguished by the elements of unity in name, object and its reference to assemblage and representation.

A multitude, on the other hand, is a large number or body of persons *indefinite*, without reference to assemblage or representation. Even if it goes by one certain name and has a common object, it cannot be regarded as a distinct, definite society, because it has not the element of unity as a body.

We have made here a very important discovery: while twelve million human beings go under one name, "Jews," they are nevertheless *not* a definite society, but a multitude. While they have one common ethical object, hence a spiritual unity, they are nevertheless still a multitude lacking the element of assemblage or representation. The twelve million Jews, then, do not constitute a collective unity. As they do not have that element of a physical unity which a society, whether small or large, must have, we find them therefore incapable of deliberating, resolving and acting in that personal capacity which

every definite society has. Being only a multitude, a body without reference to assemblage and representation, they are an abnormal association without a will, hence they may be termed a mob as well.

Having observed this chaotic state of the twelve millions of human beings who persist in going by one common name, "Jews," we ask: Can it be that the abnormal state of the Jews as a distinct multitude calls forth the emotion of prejudice within the Gentile?

In one of the foregoing chapters we have demonstrated that prejudice is an emotion, a vague idea based on something indefinite. We have also mentioned the fact that as far as the Gentile is concerned, we have to search the workings of his mind in order to discover the cause of that emotion of prejudice against the name Jew.

The question before us now is whether the abnormality of the Jews in being a

mere multitude is the cause of that emotion of prejudice.

We have therefore to institute an inquiry into the workings of the mind of man and discover how it thinks and forms ideas when confronted with bodies which have a plurality of elements.

Here we will bring to the attention of mankind a fact, which though well known to the philosopher was never appreciated in its significant relation to human society and particularly to the Jewish Question, and which we yet believe to be the missing link, so to say, in the Jewish problem so long sought after.

XI.

COLLECTIVE BODIES AND THE LAW OF THE MIND.

Treating on the relation of collective bodies to the law of the mind, which can be rightly termed *jus divinum*, there are many authorities. Immanuel Kant in his work, "Critique of Pure Reason," treats on it particularly in the chapter on "Deduction of the Pure Conception of the Understanding," wherein we find the explanation for the possibility of a conjunction of the manifold representations given by sense; of the originally synthetical unity of apperception; of the principle of the synthetical unity of apperception as the highest principle of all exercise of understanding, etc. Among the other philosophers who deal with the subject and whose works should be consulted are Spencer, Cousin, Locke and Hume.

For the purposes of this work and in order to avoid lengthy quotations, we will make use of some views of Professor Borden P. Bowne, who, in his book, "Theory of Thought and Knowledge," lays down in as simple a manner as the subject permits the following conditions of thought with respect to collective bodies. He says:

"There are multitudinous conditions of concrete thought of an accidental sort, both physiological and psychological; and there are certain other conditions given in the very structure of thought itself. Only the latter concern us here.

"And as consciousness is the absolute condition of all thought, it seems as if a discussion of consciousness were a necessary preliminary to the theory of thought. This seeming, however, is misleading. Since consciousness is an accompaniment of all

mental states, it is easy to think that it is a distinct element by itself. This is a logical illusion. The spatial figures also in which we speak of consciousness lead to the fancy that consciousness is something which contains other mental states, or which furnishes the stage for their operations. But, in fact, consciousness is no simple, homogeneous mental state antecedent to objects, or apart from objects; it arises only in connection with particular objects, and is nothing by itself. When consciousness is empty of objects there is nothing left.

“Consciousness may, indeed, exist in varying grades of clearness, from a vague sense of subjectivity and objectivity up to the distinct consciousness of self and the definite apprehension of an object; but in every case the vagueness of the consciousness is the vagueness of the apprehension; and an attempt to make the consciousness more

distinct could only direct itself to making the conception more distinct. If there be a vague, undifferentiated, unrecognized somehowness of feeling which we choose to call consciousness, it is plainly nothing for intelligence so long as it remains in this state. In order to attain to rationality this general consciousness, which is a consciousness of nothing, must in some way become a consciousness of something. Hence the question, How we come to rational and articulate consciousness, is identical with the question, How we get objects of thought and knowledge.

“Thought, as apprehending truth, exists only in the form of the judgment. The presence of ideas in consciousness, or their passage through it, is neither truth nor error, but only a mental event. Truth or error emerges only when we reach the judgment. The fundamental conditions of

the judgment, therefore, must be fundamental conditions of thought itself. These are three: the unity and identity of the thinking self, the law of identity and contradiction, and the fact of connection among the objects of thought. The first is the condition of any rational consciousness whatever. The second is the condition of our thoughts having any constant and consistent meaning. The third refers to that objective connection which thought aims to reproduce, and without which thought loses all reference to truth. As the first relates to the constitution of the subject, it might be called the subjective condition; the second might be called the formal condition; and the third, as relating to the constitution of the object, might be called the objective condition. Or, without too great inaccuracy, they might be called, respectively, the psychological, the logical and the on-

tological condition of thought. The name, however, is of no moment, provided we understand the thing.

“We consider first the unity of the mental subject as the condition of thought.

“Let us take the judgment A is B, where A and B are any two particular states of consciousness. How is this judgment possible?

“The answer is, It is possible only as there is a conscious subject M, which is neither A nor B, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness. Then, by distinguishing, comparing and uniting them in the unity of one conscious act, it reaches the judgment A is B. But so long as we have only the particular states A and B, they remain external to each other, and the judgment is non-existent and impossible.

“A demurrer is sometimes raised against this conclusion. That the ex-

ternal juxtaposition of particular thoughts can never become a thought of the particulars in their mutual relations is manifest. A conception of all the parts of a watch in separation is not a conception of the watch. The conception of the watch is not a congeries of component conceptions, but it is rather a single, unitary conception. In like manner, it is urged, the judgment is also one. It is not built out of particular states, and needs nothing beyond the one judging act itself.

“This claim is subtle rather than profound. There is a clear conception of the impossibility of building complex conceptions out of simple ones by mere juxtaposition, but along with this there is a confusion of logical simplicity with psychological simplicity. Psychologically, no doubt, the conception of plurality is as truly a single act as the conception of unity. The

conception of a watch is as truly one as the conception of a single wheel. But logically the one conception has a plurality of elements; and there can be no true thought until the unity of the conception is distinguished into the plurality of its implications. Over against the plurality we must affirm a unity; and, equally, over against the unity we must affirm a plurality. Analysis is as necessary as synthesis. The judgment, then, may be psychologically one, but logically it involves the distinction of A and B as well as their union. Without this distinction the judgment is impossible. And for this logical distinction and union alike we need something which is neither A nor B, but which comprehends and acts upon both. This something we call the self. By it we mean not anything sensuously or imaginatively presentable, but only that unitary and abiding principle revealed in thought,

and without which thought is impossible.”

From the foregoing we learn and must now constantly bear in mind in the course of our further inquiry, that there cannot be a true thought until the unity of the conception of a certain object is distinguished into the plurality of its implications; that over against the plurality the mind must affirm a unity; and equally over against the unity the mind must affirm plurality; that the judgment is psychologically one, but logically it involves the distinction of the various parts of the object as well as their relation and union; that without this distinction judgment is impossible. For this logical distinction and union alike *the mind needs* something which is not one or the other part of the object, but the object itself which comprehends and acts upon all the parts. This something is the self, the object itself. By it is

meant not anything sensuously or imaginatively presentable, but only that ordinary and abiding principle revealed in thought, without which thought is impossible.

We shall now illustrate in more detail the mentioned law of the mind:

We take the same object, a watch, as an example. The watch itself is a definite unit and the mind perceives it as a unit. Yet the watch is composed of many wheels and parts. The wheels and parts are not the watch itself, but together they make up and form one thing—the watch. We observe then that the watch is psychologically one, but logically it involves the distinction between the wheels and parts and their relation and union. Without this distinction judgment would be impossible, and for this logical distinction and union of the wheels and the parts the mind needs something which is neither a wheel nor wheels, part or parts, but something

which comprehends and acts upon all the wheels and parts. This something we call watch, which is the *self* of all the wheels and parts. In the watch there is nothing sensuously or imaginatively presentable, but there is only that unitary and abiding principle revealed in thought, without which a true thought of that self—watch, would be impossible.

What is true of the mind in its thought of a watch is true in its thought of everything else.

When we say a man, the mind has the conception of a unit, notwithstanding the fact that a man is a body composed of numerous organs and cells. Yet over against the plurality of the organs and cells the mind psychologically affirms the unity—man, and over against the unity—man, the mind logically affirms the plurality of the organs and cells. The self called man is the unitary and abiding principle revealed in thought.

Of the same kind is the conception

the mind has of corporations, whether they are small or big, local or international.

When we take as an example the American People, we find that as a whole it is a unity. This unity is composed of millions of individuals who are also divided in many parties. Yet the mind psychologically perceives over against the plurality of individuals and parties, the unity—the one American People; and logically over against the unity it affirms the plurality of individuals and parties.

Our thought then with a people is also psychologically one, but logically it involves the distinction of the millions of citizens and residents, the parties as well as their relation to one another and their union. For this logical distinction and union of a nation, the mind also needs that something which is neither one citizen nor another, neither one party nor the other, but which comprehends and

acts upon all the individuals and all the parties. The mind needs something which is the *self*, and this self it calls the *people*, the nation.

Of the American people, however, the mind can have a true thought because it is a normal society with the element of assemblage and representation. *Assemblage and representation* is the only element (not territory) which takes a body of men out of the category of a multitude and gives it the form of unity which makes it conformable to the normal state of a corporation, and which complies with that then ordinary and abiding principle revealed in thought, without which thought is impossible.

This principle consequently applies to every corporation, be it congregation, association or nation.

We will now turn our attention to the Jews and try to discover what conception the mind has concerning them.

We discover that the mind can form no true conception of what the Jews are. It cannot over against the plurality affirm a unity, nor can it over against the unity affirm a plurality. The judgment here can be neither psychological nor logical. The reason for this is that in order to enable the mind to think rightly of the collective body, the body must be a normal one. The collective object must have the *self* which is not any of the parts of which it is composed, it must be something which embraces and acts upon all the parts, thus making up the self. The Jews have it not. All the mind knows is that there are Jews, but it does not see the self, the Jewish physical unity, the Jewish people, which should be expressed by assemblage and representation, which should comprehend and act upon all the Jews. Having before it only Jews, the parts of the self, the mind has no true thought, and is therefore confused as to what the Jews are.

Having before itself only a multitude of Jews, the mind cannot psychologically or logically differentiate the parts from the whole, and the whole from the parts, and for this reason sees in every Jew and all the Jews something which it does not understand. The mind sees Jews but does not see the *self* of the Jews, the Jewish people. In this we find the reason why when the other peoples talk about Jews they refer to them as Jews, but never as the Jewish people.

Because the mind can form no true thought of the Jews, it is confused, without, however, realizing this fact, and therefore prejudice naturally arises. It is now clear why prejudice against the Jew has so long remained unexplained and why the prejudiced mind, seeing only a multitude, piled up every act and phenomenon of individual Jews on the whole multitude.

We thus also now understand why every crime or objectionable act com-

mitted by an individual Jew is charged to all the Jews.

The prejudiced mind will always pick out what is objectionable in the object it is prejudiced against.

We have thus found the answer to the Jewish question. We have thus discovered the primary cause of the prejudice against the Jew.

The prejudice is due to the abnormality of the collective unity of the Jewish people, of which the mind cannot form a definite conception. We therefore obtain that the relation of the attitude of the mind of Gentile to Jew is equal to the relation of the prejudice to the abnormality of the Jewish collective unity, or

Attitude of the mind of Gentile:
Jew::: Prejudice: Abnormality of the
Jewish collective unity.

In the foregoing answer we find the *nervus probandi* of the solution of the Jewish riddle.

XII.

FURTHER PROOF.

We have observed the law of the mind in its relation to collective bodies. We know that consciousness is no simple, homogeneous mental state, antecedent to objects, or apart from objects, but that it arises only in connection with particular objects, and is nothing by itself. When consciousness is empty of objects there is nothing left.

We have also learned that thought, as apprehending truth, exists only in the form of the judgment. The presence of ideas in consciousness, or their passage through it, is neither truth nor error, but only a mental event.

We have also made clear to ourselves under what circumstances the judgment can be true and under what circum-

stances it is impossible for the mind to form true thought.

We shall, therefore, now continue our inquiry as to that law which reigns in the mind-world, and look for further proof as to whether the mind is actually uniform in its ways when dealing with normal or abnormal bodies of a collective nature.

We are fully aware of the fact that every people and every association of men has, by reason of its manifold membership, individuals of divers characters, means and culture. There are rich and poor, ignorant and learned, honest and dishonest. Yet at no time will we charge the whole society or people with pauperism because it has some poor members; with wealth, because there are in it some capitalists; with criminal tendencies, because some of its members are criminals. It is impossible for the mind to form such conceptions because, as we have seen, it operates psychologically

and logically. It can therefore differentiate between the unity as such and its parts as such and vice versa.

This, however, is the case only with a normal society or people. When asked for a definition of what constitutes an American, or Frenchman, we will easily define them and say that they are members or citizens of this or that people, etc., without regard to their individual characteristics.

When the question is put, What constitutes a Jew? the mind somehow is perplexed and is unable to define or explain what really the Jew is. The reason for this is now obvious. The Jews as a people, lacking the element of physical unity because not having the element of assemblage and representation, constitute an abnormal collective body, a fact which makes it impossible for the mind to be psychological and logical. There are Jews, but there is not the *self* of all Jews —the Jewish people.

“Try as hard as I may,” says George H. Warner in his book, “The Jewish Spectre,” “I cannot find terms brief and at the same time comprehensive enough to put this spectre (meaning the Jews) of the popular fancy before my readers.”

Being unable to explain *briefly* what the Jew is, Mr. Warner tried to explain prolixly, and accordingly gave his readers three hundred and seventy pages of explanations of what the Jew is. Finally he succeeded in arriving at the very definite conclusion that the Jew is a *spectre*, and by this term he believes he settled the question.

We do not blame Mr. Warner or anybody else for the confusion and inconsistency shown in arriving at such conclusions regarding the Jew. They only prove beyond doubt that the mind under its laws cannot comprehend and form a true thought about a society of men in

an abnormal state—without representatives.

As an excellent illustration to what extent the mind is confused when thinking about the Jews, we quote Mr. Bernard Richards, who, in his "Discourses of Keidansky," in the chapter on "What Constitutes a Jew?" earnestly, but in his spicy, humorous way, inquires:

"And after we have read about him in the comic weeklies, have seen him delineated in popular works of fiction, have observed him caricatured in various publications, have beheld him portrayed on the vaudeville stage and have heard from the slum student of the Ghetto; after we have visited a few money-lenders — on important business—have heard our minister talk patronizingly of him, telling pityingly of how he hath a great past and possessed more than a few commenda-

ble qualities, and of how he was, alas! doomed to damnation because he would not accept the religion that he hath given to the world; after we have bought clothing in one of his stores, taken a personal peep at the Ghetto, met a reformed rabbi, conversed with a distant descendant of his people, read the polite charges of his friend, the anti-Semite, and gone down and made beautiful speeches before him prior to the election; I say even after we have done these things, or some of these things have happened to us, we must still ask the question: What constitutes the Jew?

“For a verity, he is so complex in his character, so heterogeneous in his general composition, so diverse in his activities, so many sided in his worldly appearance, so wonderfully ubiquitous, and withal such a living contradiction, that even after we have made the above painful efforts to under-

stand him, we are still at a loss to know—what we know about him.

“He represents one of the ancient races and yet is as up to date as any; he reaches deepest into the past and looks farthest into the future; he is the narrowest conservative and the most advanced radical; in religion he is the most dogmatic, sectarian, stationary, orthodox, and also the most liberal and universal reformer; he is a member of the feeblest and strongest people on earth; he has no land of his own and he owns many lands; his wealth is the talk and the envy of the world, and none is so poor as he; his riches have ever been magnified and exaggerated, his dire poverty ever overlooked. ‘As poor as a Jew’ would be a truer simile than the one now in use. He is the infamous Shylock, the money-lender, yet he borrows as much and more money than he lends to

others, only he pays his debts and so there is no talk about it; Christians and others who borrow from him go to Court, denounce him, call him Shylock, and give him several pounds of ‘tongue’ though he asks not for flesh, because it is not ‘kosher’ and because whatever he is he never is cruel. Come to think of it, what a fine thing the Shylock story has ever been for those who did not want to pay their debts!

“He loans money to kings, and the kings oppress the Jews; he is the great concentrator of wealth, and he is the Socialist and Anarchist working ardently for the abolition of the private ownership of wealth; he is eminently practical, and is ever among the world-forgetting dreamers, ‘the great host of impracticables’; he has no fine arts of his own, and he carries off the highest prizes for his glorious contribution to the arts of the nations. Now he is ex-

clusively confined to his own Hebrew religious lore, believing that beyond it there are no heights to scale, no depths to fathom, and then he becomes a Georg Brandes, a great interpreter of the literature of the world; his own literature is so Puritanical, so religious and chaste that there is hardly a single love-song to be found therein, and then comes a Heinrich Heine. He is a slave of traditions and the first to break them; persecute him and he will die for the religion of his fathers; give him freedom and he will pity them for their crude conceptions and applaud Ingersoll; he is intensely religious and the rankest infidel; he condemns the theatre as being immoral, and he is the first to hail Ibsen and applaud him, even on the Yiddish stage; there is no one so clannish and so cosmopolitan as he is, and whose contrasts can be multiplied to the abuse of time and space.

“If, then, he is everything and to be

found anywhere, to be seen in all sorts of circumstances, in all walks of life and walking in so many diverse ways making his way in such strongly contrasted conditions, how shall we know him? How shall we know what constitutes a Jew?"

Here we observe the extraordinary spectacle of a Jew (and a good Jew at that) trying in vain to define what a Jew is and giving it up as a hopeless riddle.

If the Jew himself is at a loss to explain what he is, how can it be expected of others to define him?

The Jew seems to be everything and nothing. Why such inconsistency and confusion of thought?

Do not the same phenomena enumerated by Mr. Richards concerning the Jew exist in every big society and especially in every nation? Cannot the mind with equal truth say about the

American or Englishman almost all the things that Mr. Richards says about the Jew, and yet be logical and consistent?

In a great measure, the American people is much more complex than the Jews, for in the American people we find blended all nationalities and we find in it the most extraordinary variety of men, yet the mind in thinking of the American is psychologically and logically consistent; it is not confused and offers true thought.

Can we imagine Mr. Richards or any other writer in discussing the question what constitutes an American, end in this perplexing manner: If then he (the American) is everything and to be found everywhere (Americans are also to be found in many countries), to be seen in all circumstances (there being rich and poor Americans), in all walks of life and walking in so many diverse ways (among the Americans there are also dealers, bankers, students, artists, man-

ufacturers, scientists, laborers, religious men and atheists, etc., etc.), in such strongly contrasted conditions, how shall we know him? How shall we know what constitutes an American?

Such a statement, as we see, is absolutely impossible for the mind to utter concerning any normal big society or people. The name American, or whatever name of a society it may be when applied to an individual or individuals, only designates what society or people he, she or they are members of, and nothing else. The private pursuits of individuals of a society or people have nothing to do with the society or people, when the question is for the meaning of the name of the society or nation in its relation to the individual.

We could thus quote many other authors who have made similar attempts at finding what constitutes a Jew. The reader is particularly referred to Messrs. Zangwill's and Nordau's ad-

dresses on the Jewish Question and particularly to the latter's drama, "A Question of Honor," wherein he treats on the problem. But, like Mr. Richards, they failed in the attempt to explain what constitutes a Jew.

The foregoing discourse of Keidansky is the best proof that the present state of the Jews makes it impossible for the mind to form a true conception of what they are as a whole and what they are as part of the whole. Their abnormal existence lasting nearly two thousand years, we observe that the question is as old as the abnormality of the Jewish collective body.

During the sojourn of the Israelites with the Egyptians, before they were freed by Moses from their servitude, they were also a distinct multitude consisting of shepherd tribes without assemblage and representation. At that time their abnormality as a collective body worked on the mind of man in the same

manner as it did a thousand years later when they were dispersed among the nations, and as it acts since their dispersion. When the Egyptians said, "Behold, the people of Israel are more numerous and mightier than we; come on, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply," there was the same cause for the prejudice as when Haman said to the king, "There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the peoples in all the provinces of thy kingdom, etc." There is the same cause for the prejudice this day.

The human mind seeks to understand every phenomenon, but fears riddles and condemns what it does not understand.

The natural laws of the mind are unchangeable. The mind may develop under mental laws, but it cannot change the laws themselves. While mankind, therefore, has attained a high degree of civilization, the prejudice against the Jews remains the same, because it de-

pends not on the state of civilization but on the basic mental law.

The prejudice then exists and must remain as long as the cause is not removed, or it may cease when every man in the world will realize that his prejudice against the Jews is caused by the abnormality of their collective body. But this is impossible, since the subject is too difficult for the understanding of the untrained mind.

On the other hand, reality—the fact itself demonstrated—is at once understood. But of this later.

Our assertion concerning the cause of antisemitism derives new force when we consider the attitude of the Jew toward himself, to the next Jew and toward the whole Jewish people. The fact is that the Jew is prejudiced against himself.

Observers of Jewish life have ample opportunities to notice this fact. It is only necessary to observe the conduct of Jews in their relations to one another,

their demeanor in public and when they are among Gentiles, to see to what extent the emotion of prejudice is within the Jew against himself.

“Now, don’t be a Jew! One cannot talk with a Jew! It is difficult to deal with Jews!” These are the usual remarks and comments of Jews when in dispute among themselves.

Jews are also reluctant in conversation (when they are only able to speak another language) to make use of Yiddish. They will also try to avoid reading Yiddish newspapers in public, even avoid carrying a package wrapped in a Yiddish paper, and in general they endeavor to hide anything and everything which may remind one that they are Jews.

Jews will also be much flattered when told that they don’t look like Jews, and will try to resemble the Gentile as much as possible. Only the orthodox Jews being the exception to this rule.

Some will perhaps say that the long Goluth robbed the Jew of self-respect, and that because he is regarded with disdain by others he tries to hide his identity. But this is not the fact. The true reason is that the mind of the Jew is subject to the same mental law as the Gentile's, and, therefore, he is prejudiced against himself and against all Jews for precisely the same reason as the Gentile.

We cannot find that the Gentile or the Jew is prejudiced against the spiritual unity of the Jews; on the contrary, the principles of Judaism, whether they are clearly or instinctively conscious of them, hold them in the iron grip of truth which they cannot weaken. On the spiritual unity, the Jews are normal and show it by remaining Jews. But against the physical unity of the Jewish people every man is unconsciously prejudiced. The Jews themselves are at a loss and confused as to what the Jewish people

is. They find themselves to be members of something and yet of nothing. They do not see the *self* of all the Jews—the Jewish people.

Mr. Arnold White in his book, “The Modern Jew,” referring to the Jewish people, says:

“In spite of their differences of opinion, and although scattered over the face of the earth, the Jews maintain a secret and indissoluble bond of common interest. When attacked from outside, Jewry presents a single front to the enemy.”

Mr. White cannot understand what it is which actually holds the Jews together, and he calls that something “a secret and indissoluble bond of common interest.” The fact is that their secret bond consists in the fundamental ethical principles of Judaism, which, as we have seen, are in their nature universal and

eternal. Jewry presents a single front to the enemy when attacked. This is the natural law of self-defense. Otherwise every Jew is prejudiced against himself and against all Jews. It is true that the Jews fail to realize that they are prejudiced against themselves and against one another, and deny it, but the fact, nevertheless, remains a fact.

Is it possible for one without being prejudiced against himself and the society he is a member of to pass such remarks as we have quoted? or can one consider it a compliment and a flattery when told that he does not resemble himself or the society he claims to be a member of? Can we imagine an American or Englishman or Frenchman or a member of any other nationality being flattered by such a remark? Even a Chinaman would resent such a supposed flattery. None of these are prejudiced against their respective nations. They cannot be because their nations are nor-

mal collective bodies, which enable their minds to be psychological and logical.

There is another important point concerning the Jews which still more strengthens our assertion.

At the same time when mankind regards with wonder the most remarkable solidarity among the Jews, which, by the way, is actually the fact, the Jews themselves continually complain that "there is no solidarity in Israel." They sometimes also make use of the word "unity" in that connection, but what they mean by it is "solidarity." The truth is that they do not know what they mean.

Every Jewish poet, writer of fiction, thinker and rabbi laments the strife and discord among the Jews.

Because there are, as there naturally must be, different parties among the Jews, they call it strife and quarrel in Israel. Because in a Jewish congregation there will be two factions, the Jew

will say: "There is an example for you of the solidarity among the Jews."

Now, it will never occur to an American, for instance, to accuse the American nation as being a people of discord and strife because there are Republican, Democratic and other parties. It will never enter the mind of an Englishman that, because there are two or more factions in his congregation, there is no solidarity among the English people.

We understand now why it is different with the Jew. First, we have observed that inwardly there is within him a prejudice against himself and his own by reason of the law of the mind, and, secondly, Israel feels that it is ailing. Israel knows subconsciously that there is something missing within its body called Jews. Israel feels that it needs something, but does not know what.

Collectively, the Jews in this condition resemble the ailing man who suffers without knowing what particular remedy

will cure his malady. He naturally complains, finds fault with the place, with the atmosphere, with himself and with everybody. In his agony he calls for things which at least somewhat resemble the remedy he is actually in need of. Unconsciously he is near that something which will cure the disease; but ignorant of the real cause he consequently fails to name the remedy. Even if a physician correctly diagnoses his malady and prescribes the real medicine which will remove the cause of the suffering, the patient may fail to see the import of that remedy and refuse to submit to it. Under such circumstances force must be used with the patient and the remedy administered against his will. After the recovery the physician can say with triumph to the obstinate sufferer: Now, *vide et crede*.

In the course of the two thousand years since Israel's dispersion among the nations, neither he nor his physicians

have realized what is really the cause of his sufferings. The result is that they called for remedies which pointed to the removal of the effects, but not of the cause of the malady.

Frequently we find some Jews as well as men of other nationalities come pretty near administering the right cure. There was considerable discussion about establishing that normal condition in Israel which a collective body of men must have. There were attempts at establishing synods and other representative bodies for all-Israel, and in these the Jews instinctively saw the *omen faustum* for better days. Unfortunately all those suggestions and attempts were not the result of the knowledge that this remedy will remove the primary cause of the Jewish malady, but were mere guesswork which led to nothing or to very little improvement of the conditions of the Jews.

Ignorant of the real primary cause of

the Jewish malady, the various physicians who attended upon the patient—the Jewish people—have only stumbled into the right way, but were swerved from their positions by the first complications and difficulties which arose in the way and they wandered off in opposite directions.

Till this very day Israel's voice calls to the Jews for solidarity, but what it really means and is in need of is the collective physical unity of the Jews.

Strange as it is, at all times since the diaspora and up to the present day, the names "Israel" and "Jew" impress the mind in a strikingly different manner. The mind realizes that the names "Israel" and "Jew" mean one and the same thing, yet its impression of these names is somehow different. The name "Israel" is regarded as something definite and normal, while the name "Jew" is considered as something vague, mysterious, puzzling.

Why?

Because when the mind thinks of "Israel," it *unconsciously* thinks of the normal Israel which lived and acted in a natural collective capacity. But when the mind thinks of the "Jew," it has no true thought concerning that name, because the Jew in his collective form is an abnormality.

It is true that the mind is unaware and unconscious of the aforementioned reasons for its activities. This is because the mind, as we have pointed out, works under certain laws without realizing the fact. It is only the scientific psychologist who knows more or less the laws under which the mind works, and it is therefore only the scientific psychologist who realizes the reasons for the various mental phenomena.

To return to the Jew, there can be no doubt that his prejudice against himself and against all the Jews is the result of the same cause. We only see that the

law of the mind knows of no distinctions, and enforces itself with Jew as with Gentile. The Jew perhaps is yet more prejudiced against the Jews than the Gentile, if we can judge by the sentiments and actions of such Jews who have abandoned their people altogether. A Jewish antisemite is always worse than one of another nationality. This is because the Jew suffers from the abnormality of the Jewish people, of which he is a member, and the suffering adds to the Jewish antisemite's prejudice the irritability and cruelty of the sick.

We, therefore, arrive at the following important principles which, from the foregoing observations, appear to be fundamentally true:

(I.) When men constitute a collective body—an association for certain purposes—they must by the law of nature and the law of the mind (if we may separately use these terms) have

representatives, without which the collective body is unnatural—an abnormality.

(II.) When men adhere in great numbers to a certain idea, they do by reason of the idea constitute a distinct class, and by law of nature and the law of the mind they must, therefore, as such, have representatives.

These fundamental principles prove that the doctrine of anarchy is contrary to the laws of nature and the laws of the mind which require, above all things, *normality* and *order*.

XIII.

OF KNOWLEDGE AND REASON VS. SUPERSTITION AND PREJUDICE AND OF THEORY AND FACT.

Prejudice and Superstition take flight when Knowledge and Reason appear. The mind is so constituted that it can hold neither Superstition and Knowledge together, nor Prejudice and Reason together. Prejudice and Superstition *often* go hand in hand, each, then, being the complement of the other. Knowledge and Reason, on the other hand, *always* go together, Reason ever following Knowledge.

The triumph of Knowledge and Reason over Prejudice and Superstition results in the *Progress* of mankind.

“Knowledge is Power.” This power consists in the ability of Knowledge to purify Reason. Reason, in its purity, is Truth.

Superstition and Prejudice are the offspring of Ignorance—of the crude condition of the mind. They are, therefore, Error. The crudeness of the mind is not its diseased condition, but merely its undeveloped state. Knowledge, therefore, polishes Reason and develops it, and reduces the mind to a pure state. The mind, in that polished condition, can produce pure Reason, and then sees the truth.

Superstitions and prejudices, as we have seen, are not a mental disease, they are, therefore, not hereditary. If they were natural maladies of the mind, there would be no possible chance for Knowledge and Reason ever to take root; and there could be no Progress.

The mind is progressive because it is a healthy organism, capable of development through Knowledge.

Superstitions and Prejudices may be handed down from father to son by traditions, through the means of mouth and

pen, but they cannot be transmitted in the blood. Ideas are not hereditary.

Superstitions and Prejudice, therefore, can live in the mind only till the time when Knowledge and Reason enter the mind. There is necessarily a battle at first between the old ideas which are the former occupants of the mind, and the new ideas which invade and expel the old ones.

The length of time of such battles depends on how deeply rooted the old ideas are in the mind.

The mind's desire to retain them is what we call *Habit*. The longer the Habit existed the harder is the battle of Knowledge and Reason against the inveterate Superstitions and Prejudices. The result, however, is always the same. Knowledge and Reason are ever the conquerors.

Only a memory will remain in the mind of its former ideas, and it will

wonder how it could ever lend itself to the former views.

When, in our advanced times, we still meet superstitions and prejudices regarding certain matters and phenomena, it is evidence that our Knowledge and Reason are not mature on all things and that in our mind there are numerous recesses to which the light of knowledge and pure reason has not yet penetrated.

Having obtained light on the primary cause of antisemitism, and knowing that the Jewish Question exists, not because there is anything wrong about the Jews as men, but because their abnormal state as a collective body of Jews makes it impossible for the mind (which acts under certain laws of its own) to be psychological and logical as regards the Jews, the problem, the Jewish Question, is solved. But for whom is it solved?

It is solved only for those who have the knowledge and reason which explains

the cause for the prejudice against the Jews. For those who have not that knowledge and reason the Jewish Question must continue to exist.

To solve practically the Jewish Question for all mankind by means of education, it would be necessary to reach every civilized man. Considering that in order to understand the answer to the problem a cultured mind is required, and that the vast majority of men are not students, it appears that a solution by education is impossible before the lapse of a great many centuries.

Supposing that well-known authorities should come out with a statement to all mankind that there is nothing wrong about the Jews, and that they find the prejudice against them unjustified, would such a statement solve the question?

In an earlier part of this work we have discussed the relation of problem solvers and mankind, and have seen that

mankind has confidence in the opinions of problem solvers only when the latter demonstrate by fact that their theories are right.

How can the theorist demonstrate the theory presented in this work?

We realize that to understand the abstract is difficult, whereas to believe in the concrete is easy. The abstract is only an idea, and is believed when reduced to a reality. As soon as an idea is realized it ceases to be a theory, it becomes a fact, and, as such, is easily believed, notwithstanding its intricacies. The concrete fact speaks more than hundreds of abstract illustrations and arguments regarding its possibility.

When Marconi, for instance, at first brought forward his theory regarding wireless telegraphy, it was an idea. In the mind of Marconi only, and in the minds of such who, like him, understood the theory, wireless telegraphy was a

fact before it was realized, but not in the mind of mankind.

How long would it have taken to convince the world by explanation that the theory of wireless telegraphy is correct?

Ten centuries of education would, perhaps, not have sufficed to convince all men that wireless telegraphy can be a fact, whereas the fact itself was believed the very day it was announced that a message was sent and received by wireless.

The same thing will be true of this theory in the case of the Jews.

XIV.

SUMMING UP.

To sum up the contents of this work we obtain the following:

There is no other cause of anti-semitism than one. This one consists in the emotion of prejudice of the Gentile against the Jew. All other given causes are only the effects of the one cause—the emotion of prejudice.

Prejudice against the Jews is not hereditary.

The emotion of prejudice is actually not against the Jew, but against the name Jew.

The name Jew identifies not the individual Jew alone, but the whole Jewish people, the individual Jew being only a member, a part of the whole.

There is no Jewish people, but there exists a multitude of Jews.

A multitude is not a society, or a people, though the multitude may exist under one certain name.

The difference between a people and a multitude is that the latter lacks the element of assemblage and representation.

A multitude should be of only temporary duration; if it is permanent it is an abnormal society.

The mind works under a certain law and can form a true judgment of collective bodies only when these are normal.

An abnormal collective body makes it impossible for the mind to be psychological and logical. Without these the mind cannot form a true conception either of the body or of any or all of its parts and their relation and union as such.

When the mind is unable to form a true and definite thought regarding a collective body, and the latter exists for a long time, it becomes confused as to the meaning of the body and its parts,

and unconsciously develops the emotion of prejudice against the object and its parts, and even becomes superstitious regarding the body as time goes on without its finding an explanation of the riddle.

The cause of the emotion of prejudice against the Jews is that the mind cannot understand and explain what the collective body of Jews represents. The mind, by reason of the abnormality of the Jewish collective body, cannot be psychological and logical. It is confused, has no clear idea, and conceives a repugnance and prejudice against the abnormal object—the Jews.

The law of the mind enforces itself on the conservative mind as well as on the radical; the ignorant as well as the educated; the Aryan as well as the Semite—in fact, all possible classes of men. Therein we find the reason why all classes of men, including the Jews themselves, are prejudiced against the Jews.

The Jews are an international ethical and spiritual society. No matter how vast a membership a society, whether local or international, may have, in order to be a normal association and not a mere multitude, it must have the elements of assemblage and representation, these being the only elements which distinguish a normal society from a multitude. Assemblage of an international society takes the form of representation. The Jews have it not.

Our mental blindness on the Jewish Question is cured. Our eyes have opened and we see in what the mystery of the Jewish riddle consists.

XV.

FINAL ANSWER.

The difficult part of our work on the Jewish Question is over. To trace the primary cause of a malady is always harder than to discover the remedy. The knowledge of the cause itself points to what the remedy should be.

Knowing that the primary cause of the troubles of the Jews lies in the fact that the Jews are a collective body, deviating from the normal structure of an association of men, thereby causing confusion in the mind even of every Jew, and especially in the mind of the non-Jew, and thus creating that hatred against themselves which is known as antisemitism, we see that the remedy suggests itself by indicating that it is necessary to transform the present chaotic state of the Jews into a state of

order and normality; in other words, to change the multitude of Jews into a society of Jews.

We have observed that the difference between a society and a multitude consists not in the one possessing a territory and the other not, but only in the fact that the normal association has the element of assemblage and representation, while the multitude has it not. There is no normal association in a collective body of men when they are without representatives who bear the same relation to the collective body as the head of an individual to a natural body. A multitude therefore is a headless body and for this reason is not capable of deliberating, resolving and acting in a personal capacity. A multitude has no will and consequently no corporate status.

If it is a permanent multitude, it is a permanent living abnormality, which must cause that confusion in the mind which results in the emotion of preju-

dice and even the emotion of superstition against itself, and consequently also against every member of the permanent abnormal society.

The only way, then, to remove the cause of prejudice against itself is, as we have said, that the multitude should cease to be a multitude and become a normal society with representatives—with a head. The world will not regard such a step on the part of the Jews as improper. There being no *pactum illicium* among the Jews, but an ethical purpose for their existence as a people, mankind will have nothing against it, provided this fact is explained to the world in a proper way by a fitting Declaration.

If the multitude is a local one, to become a normal association it must have local representatives, but if it is an international multitude it must then have international representatives, an international head.

The Jews are scattered all over the

world. Being, as we have pointed out, an international multitude, we find a prejudice against them, collectively and individually, international as well. The fact is that antisemitism is universal.

The international head of the Jews is to consist of representatives from every locality where Jews are. Such bodies are deliberative and there must also be officers to carry out and execute the orders of the deliberative body, hence executive officers.

As the representatives will come from various parts of the world to represent the Jewish international society it will consequently be an international Jewish congress with executive officers, and as the international society of Jews is a permanent society, it must have a permanent International Jewish Congress with Executive Officers.

As the Jews are by *communi consensu* Jews, they must also by the same consent submit to order and normality as a dis-

tinct society of Jews, and they will if the prominent men in Israel will call upon them to give up the life of a multitude and become the International Jewish People.

It is true that it is difficult to make a people unlearn its errors and the habit of living like a multitude. But when the pressure from the outside is so hard it will not be difficult to make the millions of Jews realize what the primary cause of their troubles is, and that the remedy is within their reach and depends entirely upon them, namely, the establishment of a permanent International Jewish Congress with executive officers.

This is the *praescriptum* for the Jewish multitude which, if acted upon, will destroy the germ of the primary cause of antisemitism.

Soblata causa, tollitur effectus.

This is the final answer to the old Jewish Question.

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